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                                                    Abstract  
A number of studies have shown that observation of another person’s actions can 
modulate one’s own actions such as when two individuals cooperate in order to 
complete a joint task. However, little is known about whether or not direct matching 
of specific movements is modulated by the goals of the actions observed. In a series 
of seven experiments we employed an action observation paradigm in which two co-
actors sat opposite each other and took turns to reach out to targets presented on a 
shared workspace. Importantly, co-actors performed either the same goal at the 
reached-to location or a different goal. Although results consistently showed that the 
reaching action of one individual slows the observer’s reaching action to the same 
spatial location, the effect was not modulated according to the adopted goals of co-
actors. These findings challenge the notion that the processes involved in the 
imitation of specific movements code for the action goals of those movements.  
                                    Public significance of the work 
It is well known that we, as humans, often imitate the actions of other people. 
Interestingly, this can include the imitation of specific motor patterns. For instance, if 
we see another person reach out with their right arm this will speed up the time it 
takes us to reach out with our own right arm. However, it is not yet known whether 
this imitation effect is dependent upon the observer and the person being observed 
having the same reason (or ‘goal’) for performing the action. For example, if the 
person being observed reached out to pick up a coffee cup will they still speed up the 
observer’s action if they reach out to pick up a pen to write with? The present 
research assessed this question and found that imitation effects are not influenced by 
goals. 
Key words:  Attention; movement compatibility; IOR; Social; Joint action; imitation 
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                                           General introduction 
             The past decade or so has seen a growth in the number of studies examining 
the cognitive processes that occur when an individual observes another person’s 
action. Such action observation studies are often placed within the context of 
perceptuo-motor models (e.g., Hommel, 2009; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999; Knoblich & 
Sebanz, 2006; Prinz, 1997) in which, rather than being separate, perception and action 
are said to share cognitive representations. One assumption that follows from these 
models is that an action by one individual activates an equivalent internal motor 
representation in an observer. Consequently, observing a specific manual movement 
can influence an observer’s own preparation for that same movement; what Iacoboni 
et al. (1999) refer to as the direct matching hypothesis. 
            A typical effect was reported by Liepelt, Von Cramon, and Brass, (2008; see 
also, Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Kilner, Paulignan, & 
Blakemore, 2003). In their experiment, participants viewed images of a hand 
topographically oriented in the same position as their own response hand. As one of 
the fingers was lifted on the stimulus hand, a target also appeared requiring the 
participants to raise either their middle or index finger. The important manipulation 
was the compatibility between the finger raised on the stimulus hand and that lifted 
by the participants. A compatible trial was one in which, for instance, the index finger 
on the photograph was raised and the response also required the index finger to be 
raised. An incompatible trial by contrast was one in which the index finger on the 
photograph was raised but the response required the middle finger to be raised. 
Results showed that response time (RT) was shorter for compatible trials compared 
with incompatible trials. As described above, this finding suggests that the 
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mechanisms responsible for planning specific movements are sensitive to features of 
the observed movement. 
            A further example that has generated considerable interest, and that is central 
to the present work, illustrates how one person’s reaching action can modulate the 
reaching action of an observer (Atkinson, Skarratt, Simpson, & Cole, 2014; Cole, 
Skarratt, & Billing, 2012; Cole, Wright, Doneva, & Skarratt., 2015; Doneva & Cole, 
2014; Hayes, Hansen, & Elliott, 2010; Lyons, Weeks, & Elliott, 2013; Ondobaka, de 
Lange, Newman-Norlund, Wiemers, & Bekkering, 2012; Skarratt, Cole, & 
Kingstone., 2010; Welsh et al., 2007; Welsh et al., 2007; Welsh, Manzone, & 
McDougall, 2014; Welsh, McDougall, & Weeks, 2009; Welsh, Ray, Weeks, Dewey, 
& Elliott, 2009). In the basic paradigm, first described by Welsh et al. (2005), two 
people are seated opposite across a table and take turns to reach out to targets 
appearing to the left or right on a workspace between them (see Figure 1). Welsh et 
al. reported that RT increased for targets appearing at the same location as a co-
actor’s previous response. The authors suggested that this same-location slowing 
effect was due to a combination of action-perception representations and mechanisms 
giving rise to inhibition of return (IOR; Posner & Cohen, 1984). Specifically, Welsh 
et al. argued that observing a co-actor’s response activates the corresponding response 
codes in the observer, with slowed reaching to the same location reflecting the 
inhibition accrued from returning attention and repeating responses1. This 
interpretation is supported by the finding that when a single individual makes two 
consecutive responses to the same location, RT in the second response increases 
relative to a response made to a different location (Maylor & Hockey, 1985; 
Tremblay, Welsh, & Elliott, 2005; Welsh et al. 2005).  
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          One of the central theoretical questions associated with action observation 
studies is whether the mechanisms that represent action and motor responses also 
represent the goals of those actions. In a broad sense this is clearly the case in highly 
coordinated actions such as when two individuals move a piece of furniture. As well 
as representing the overall goal, each co-actor needs to represent the other’s actions 
with respect to immediate sub-goals (e.g., avoiding a door frame). This kind of goal 
hierarchy is central to the goal directed theory of imitation (Bekkering, Wohlschläger, 
& Gattis, 2000), which makes the distinction between imitation processes that 
represent end-point actions (i.e., goals) and those that represent motor commands or 
‘kinematics primitives’ (i.e., specific movements). The theory suggests that 
mechanisms associated with the former have primacy over mechanisms associated 
with the latter, an idea for which there is growing support. For example, when 
observers are asked to imitate an action, they tend to copy the goal of the action rather 
than the kinematics of the movements that brought about the goal (Bekkering, et al., 
2000). Furthermore, Longo, Kosobud, and Bertenthal (2008) suggest that 
representation of actions at the level of goals is an automatic ‘default response’. 
Moreover, the mirror neuron system, hypothesised as one of the mechanisms 
subserving action understanding (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992), 
is thought to primarily represent goals rather than body movement (e.g., Rizzolatti, 
Fabbri-Destro & Cattaneo, 2008).  
            Since goals and intentions are more important in everyday joint actions 
compared with specific movements, the dominance of goals over kinematics has clear 
functional utility. Indeed, during goal imitation the mechanisms associated with 
kinematic imitation may be somewhat redundant or even inhibited. This is because a 
single goal often can be achieved via several different kinematic routes, while a single 
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kinematic route can eventuate into several different outcomes. The focus of the 
present study is to examine whether the underlying goals of an actor influence the 
initiation of specific movements of an observer. To be clear, our experiments are not 
concerned with the question of whether goals are important for modulating an 
observer’s action, or even modulating the perception of those actions, they evidently 
are (i.e., Bekkering, et al., 2000; and see Hudson, Nicholson, Ellis, & Bach, 2016, for 
perception). Rather, our experiments examined whether goals modulate imitative 
movements, i.e., those that occur as a result of direct matching. A number of 
experiments do suggest that goals influence kinematics. For example, Wohlschläger 
and Bekkering, (2002) reported that finger movement responses were sensitive to 
whether the observed fingers of a model were directed towards a goal or not (see also 
Bouquet, Shipley, Capa, & Marshall, 2010). Using a similar finger movement 
paradigm, Liepelt et al., (2008) showed that the degree of imitative matching was 
modulated according to whether the model intentionally moved their fingers (i.e., 
adopted a goal), as opposed to having them moved by a mechanical device. However, 
these goals tended to be relatively simple in nature (e.g., the volitional pressing of a 
button), whereas goals requiring greater dexterity to accomplish them have shown no 
influence on kinematics. In one such example, Cole et al. (2012) used a variant of the 
Welsh et al. (2005) arm reaching paradigm described above. In each of three 
experiments, participants reached to either the same or opposite location to their 
partner, but then performed one of two end-point actions. For instance, in one 
experiment participants were required to either touch a corner of a diamond or 
pretend to grip the diamond as if they were going to pick it up. In another experiment, 
participants reached to a pencil and either wrote a digit on a pad or used its opposite 
end to erase a digit. Importantly, on half of the trials both actors performed the same 
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task and therefore adopted the same goal as each other (e.g., both wrote a digit), 
whilst on the other half they performed a different task (e.g., one wrote, one erased). 
Results from all three experiments showed that the presence and magnitude of the 
basic same-location slowing effect was independent of the co-actors’ goal states. That 
is, the magnitude of the differences between RTs to targets presented at the same and 
different locations was not affected by the (in)compatibility of the goals of the task. 
These findings suggest that the mechanisms that represent observed kinematics do not 
code for goals (or that subsequent action planning and initiation was insensitive to 
goals and the coding of movement kinematics was the primary influence). 
Furthermore, one other direct matching study has shown an effect that is opposite to 
what might be expected if goals are represented (i.e., a significantly smaller effect for 
actions that are compatible with those observed (Chiavarino, Bugiani, Grandi, & 
Colle, 2013).  
             In contrast to the findings of Cole et al. (2012), Ondobaka et al. (2012), also 
employing the Welsh et al. paradigm, reported that observed goal states do modulate 
specific movements during action observation. In their experiment, the participant 
and a confederate co-actor were each presented with two playing cards, one located 
on the left and one on the right of the workspace. The participant was required to 
reach to the playing card with the higher (or lower) value based on the value selected 
by the co-actor on the previous trial. On one block of trials, if the co-actor reached to 
the higher card, the participant was asked to do the same on their turn (i.e., reach to 
their higher card). In contrast, on another block, the participant was asked to do the 
opposite with respect to the co-actor. For instance, if the co-actor reached for the 
higher card the participant was asked to reach to the lower card. Thus, as with Cole et 
al., the two co-actors either had a congruent or incongruent action goal and reached to 
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either the same or a different spatial location. Unlike Cole et al. however, Ondobaka 
et al. found that RTs were modulated by the congruency of goals adopted by the co-
actors, i.e., the same-location slowing effect occurred only when both actors 
performed the same task. In a follow-up study using the same arm reaching paradigm, 
Ondobaka, Newman-Norlund, de Lange, and Bekkering (2013) reported that 
observers spontaneously represent the goals of their co-actor. Given the benefits 
associated with an ability to predict others’ actions, such a finding is consistent with 
Sebanz, Knoblich, and Prinz’s (2005) argument that “one may find oneself unable not 
to represent others’ actions and intentions” (p1245).  
          Given the contrasting findings, the aim of the present study was to examine 
whether the mechanisms associated with the generation of imitative movements 
represent the goals of the action observed. Interestingly, there are several 
methodological differences between the studies of Cole et al. (2012) and Ondobaka et 
al. (2012; 2013) may point to the conditions under which goal representation 
influences kinematics. For example, in the experiments of Cole et al., the goal 
adopted by an observer’s co-actor was independent of the observer’s task. By 
contrast, in the experiment of Ondobaka et al. (2012), participants were required to 
monitor their co-actor’s action on a trial-by-trial basis. Despite Ondobaka et al.’s 
(2013) later claim concerning spontaneous goal recognition, this difference suggests 
that actions may code for goals only when the movements of a co-actor are relevant 
to one’s own. Furthermore, the Cole et al. experiments manipulated goals in terms of 
the action to be performed at the end-point of the reaching response (e.g., whether to 
draw or erase a digit). By contrast, Ondobaka et al. manipulated goals at the start 
point (to which stimulus participants should reach). Hence, it may be that observers’ 
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kinematic mechanisms represent only the selection goals of a co-actor rather than 
their end-point goal. 
           In the present experiments, participants alternated reaching responses to the 
same or opposite location to their partner. This served to generate the basic arm 
reaching phenomenon reported by Welsh et al. (2005) and Skarratt et al. (2010). We 
then assessed the effect of goals on movements by manipulating the goal congruity of 
co-actors, such that they performed either the same or a different goal. The different 
experiments examined a number of ways in which goals might influence kinematic 
imitation, including task relevancy (Experiment 1), start- versus end-point action 
(Experiment 2), location of response (Experiment 3), top-down versus bottom-up 
processes (Experiment 4), and cooperation on a shared task (Experiment 5). Although 
these experiments consistently yielded an action observation effect, the effect was 
largely independent of the goal congruency of participants. Experiments 6 and 7 were 
direct replications of the designs employed by Ondobaka et al. (2012; 2013). Results 
again showed no goal-influenced effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that 
when individuals perform a similar kinematic action to one just observed, the  
processes mediating action observation and action planning are insensitive to the 
underlying goals. 
                                                 Experiment 1 
           The work of Folk, Remington, and Johnston (1992) revealed the importance of 
task relevance on the propensity with which a stimulus can modulate attention. For 
instance, a nominally ‘task irrelevant’ colour cue is more likely to capture attention 
when the target being searched for is defined by colour (Folk et al., 1992). With 
respect to joint action, studies demonstrate that knowledge of a co-actor’s intention 
can influence an observer’s action planning. For example, Sun and Thomas (2013) 
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showed that target detection was improved for targets that appeared adjacent to a co-
actor’s hands, but only when they were relevant to accomplishing a shared goal. In 
the action observation experiments of Cole et al. (2012), participants undertook a 
number of different blocks in which they either performed the same task as their co-
actor or a different task. Although participants were aware of the task being 
performed by their partner, and indeed could see this task throughout the trials, the 
task was not relevant to their own – that is, participants did not need to monitor their 
partner’s actions. By contrast, in the Ondobaka et al. (2012) experiment (although not 
Ondobaka et al. 2013), the required goal for participants on each trial was determined 
by the actions of their co-actor. In other words, the participant knew what to do on 
any particular trial only by observing what their co-actor had just done on the 
previous trial (e.g., reach to a high card). This methodological difference, as with the 
Sun and Thomas study, suggests that the action observation system may only 
represent or prioritize a co-actor’s goals when their actions are directly relevant to the 
observer’s goal. We therefore closely replicated Experiment 1 of Cole et al. (2012) 
with the exception that we manipulated whether a co-actor’s task was relevant or 
irrelevant to the participant’s task. On all trials, participants were presented with a 
single diamond figure target on one side of the display and required to perform one of 
two possible end-point responses on the object. On task irrelevant blocks they were 
told which of the two tasks their co-actor would be performing but that it was 
incidental to their own task, whilst on task relevant blocks they were told that they 
should copy the action that their co-actor had just performed on each trial. 
                                                   Method  
Participants. Cole et al. (2012) and Ondobaka et al. (2013) both employed 16 
participants in their experiments. We therefore decided, a priori, to employ 16 
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participants in all the seven experiments we report here. The exception to this was 
Experiment 2 in which 18 participants were included. This experiment was 
undertaken some time before the others when we did not fully weight the 
consideration of participant number in our recruitment. Each experiment, including 
the one referred to in the discussion to Experiment 7, was composed of a different set 
of participants who were naive to its purpose. In all experiments, with the exception 
of Experiment 4, the participant’s co-actor was a confederate whose responses were 
not analysed.  
Stimuli and apparatus. In the action observation paradigm of Welsh et al. (2005), co-
actors inevitably sit in slightly different positions with respect to the workspace and 
stimuli. We therefore provide all measurements in mm instead of visual angle. A 
black fixation cross (0.4 cd/m2 measured on-screen) was presented in the centre 
against a uniform white background (66.4 cd/m2). The participants were instructed to 
reach to a black diamond (0.4 cd/m2) that measured 27 mm along each side. This 
diamond would appear 175 mm from the fixation cross, as measured from its middle. 
Stimuli were presented on a 22” LCD monitor built into a table positioned between 
each co-actor and a Keytec touchscreen was located over the monitor. Participants sat 
with their chests approximately 240 mm from a ‘home’ button and the monitor was 
740 mm from the floor. Participants made a response by moving their right hand from 
the home button to the target object. The interval between target presentation and the 
release of the home button was recorded and this was used as RT. Many previous 
papers that have used the present paradigm have also recorded and reported arm/hand 
movement times (e.g., Skarratt et al. 2010; Welsh et al. 2005). None, however, has 
found any effects, demonstrating that the basic phenomenon reflects processes 
occurring prior to an action being initiated. We therefore do not report movement 
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times in any of the present experiments. The exception to this is Experiment 7 in 
which we performed a replication of a previous study that did include movement time 
in the analysis. An RM Pentium PC running custom software controlled stimulus 
generation and the recording of responses.  
Design and procedure. We employed a within-participants 2 x 2 x 2 design. The first 
factor manipulated target location relative to the previous trial (repeated or opposite). 
A repeated trial was one in which the target occurred at the same location whilst an 
opposite trial was one in which the target occurred on the opposite side. Recall that 
differences in these two levels generate the basic action observation effect in which 
RTs are usually longer on repeated (same) location trials than on different (opposite) 
location trials. The second factor manipulated the goal each co-actor performed with 
respect to each other (same or different). The third factor manipulated task relevancy. 
Either the confederate co-actor’s task was relevant to the participant or irrelevant. 
Participants took part in four blocks of trials crossing task relevancy (relevant, 
irrelevant) with goals (same, different) which were counterbalanced across 
participants in a Latin square. Only the target location factor was mixed within 
blocks. Participants (and the co-actor) performed one of two goals; they were asked to 
either “touch the point of the diamond nearest to you” or “pretend to grip the diamond 
with your thumb and index finger as if you are going to pick it up”. In the two task 
irrelevant blocks, the co-actor’s goal was not relevant to the goal of the participant 
and they were informed of this. At the beginning of the two task irrelevant blocks, 
participants were told that they should perform the touch task on every trial. On one 
of these blocks the co-actor would perform the same goal on every trial (i.e., touch) 
whilst on the other block he would perform a different goal (i.e., grip). Participants 
were told which of the two goals their co-actor would be performing at the beginning 
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of each block. On the two task relevant blocks, participants were told to attend to 
what the co-actor did on each trial and either repeat that action (i.e., goal) or perform 
the other action. Therefore, unlike the two task irrelevant blocks, on these two blocks 
the co-actor performed a different goal trial-by-trial; a goal that was directly relevant 
to the participant’s task. On the (task relevant) trials in which the confederate co-actor 
responded, he was informed which response to make by the word ‘grip’ or ‘touch’ 
that appeared on screen in a position visible only to him. Participants were asked to 
alternate responses with the co-actor, respond as quickly and as accurately as possible, 
and to return their hand to the home button after a response. The program generated 
random target locations using the same constraints as in Welsh et al. (2005). Thus, the 
frequency with which repeated and opposite trials occurred was the same as was the 
number of left and right targets. Furthermore, no target appeared on the same side 
more than four times in a row. Five-hundred ms elapsed between response completion 
and the appearance of the next target. Four blocks of trials were presented, each being 
composed of 209 trials; 105 for the confederate co-actor and 104 trials for the 
participant. Participants were also given 16 practice trials. All experiments reported 
here were approved by the psychology department’s ethics committee at the 
University of Essex. Participant consent was obtained through a system in which 
individuals chose one of a number of experiments to perform as part of a psychology 
undergraduate ‘methods’ module. The exception to this was the experiment reported 
in the discussion section of Experiment 7 where participants chose to undertake the 
experiment in return for £8. These participants were both undergraduates and 




                                         Results and discussion 
           In addition to frequentialist null hypothesis significance testing, we conducted 
a series of Bayesian analyses for each experiment using the free software JASP 
version 0.7.5.6. (Love et al., 2015; Morey & Rouder, 2011). Using effect size 
distributions, the software computes Bayes factors that compare against two 
competing hypotheses by assessing the relative probability of the observed data 
according to each. A model was calculated for each main effect and interaction across 
all experiments using the default prior estimate, which treats each model as equally 
probable. This Bayesian approach allowed us to compare the models for goal 
congruency and action observation against the null hypothesis, as well as the 
interaction model against the null hypothesis. In addition, following Wagenmakers 
(2007), we compared models of single or additive main effects against interaction 
models, which is not possible under traditional frequentialist methods. Thus we could 
evaluate the relative evidence for an influence of goals on action observation, against 
the evidence for the alternative, where these factors were independent and/or additive. 
In addition we report analyses comparing Bayes factors for interaction models, with 
main effects models as alternative hypotheses. In interpreting the strength of evidence 
in favour of a particular alternative hypothesis, we adopt the approach of Rafferty 
(1995). 
          Outliers (RTs beyond ±2 SDs for each participant’s condition mean) accounted 
for 4.2% of responses in Experiment 1 and were omitted from further analysis. Figure 
2 shows mean RTs. An ANOVA with target location (repeated or opposite), goal 
(same or different), and task relevancy (relevant or irrelevant) as within-participants 
factors revealed a significant main effect of target location, F(1, 15) = 32.6, p  < .001, 
2
pη = .685, BF10 = 3.25e+6, and task relevancy, F(1, 15) = 8.1, p < .01, 
2
pη = .35, 
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BF10 = 187172.12, but no main effect of goal, F(1, 15) = .05, p > .82, 2pη  .003, BF10 
= 0.20. The interaction between goal and task relevancy was not significant, F(1, 15) 
= .01, p >.9, 2
pη  .001, BF10 = 8531.88, neither was the interaction between task 
relevancy and target location, F(1, 15) = .18, p =.62, 2
pη = .01, BF10 = 1.23e +6. 
There was, however, a significant goal by target location interaction, F(1, 15) = 4.8, p 
= .04, 2
pη = .24, BF10 = 163138.05, and a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 15) = 
6.3, p = .02, 2
pη = .30, BF10 = 5158.88. The Bayesian analysis compared the additive 
main effects model containing target location and task relevancy, with a model 
specifying an interaction between goal and target location. This analysis revealed 
preference for the additive main effects model over the interaction model between 
these factors, BF10 = 3.99, corresponding to weak evidence in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis that there was a main effect of task relevancy and target 
location only over an interaction. However the three-way interaction model was 
preferred over this additive model, BF10 = 4195.03, which corresponds to very strong 
evidence in favour of a three-way interaction between target location, goal and task 
relevancy. The Bayesian analysis thus supports the results of the ANOVA, namely 
that although there is no evidence in favour of an interaction between goal and target 
location, a three-way interaction between these factors and task relevancy was 
supported.        
          The first important aspect of these results is the presence of the action 
observation effect reported by Welsh et al. (2005). Participants had longer RTs when 
responding to the target at the same position as the co-actor’s previous response than 
to the opposite location. This finding replicates the many earlier reports of the 
phenomenon (e.g., Ondobaka et al. 2012; Skarratt et al. 2010; Welsh et al. 2005; 
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2007). Most importantly, however,  was the finding that task relevancy influenced the 
degree to which the effect was modulated by the goals of the co-actor: when the co-
actor’s goal was relevant to the participant’s task, the action observation effect was 
larger when actors had a different goal compared to when they had the same goal. By 
contrast, when the co-actor’s goal was not relevant to the participant’s task, the action 
observation effect did not differ according to whether the same goal was performed or 
not. This was confirmed by two separate 2 x 2 follow-up ANOVAs (on the relevant 
and irrelevant condition means) which revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 15) = 
12.0, p = .003, 2
pη = .44, BF10 = 5.67 when the co-actors’ task was relevant but no 
such interaction when the co-actors task was irrelevant, , F(1, 15) = .5, p =.493, 2
pη = 
.03, BF10 = 1.30. Importantly, this additional analysis and results are opposite to what 
the goals-based theory of direct matching predicts, as well as the results obtained by 
Ondobaka et al; one should expect a larger, not smaller, action observation effect 
when co-actors have the same goal. The fact that the present results do show a goal-
based effect demonstrates that the present experimental design is sensitive enough to 
reveal the influence of goals. This finding is therefore consistent with the results of 
Chavarino et al. (2013) who found that an action observation effect was smaller when 
a participant’s action was compatible with that of an observed action. It is not, 
however, consistent with the notion that movements are facilitated when the observed 
and performed action match with respect to goal.  
                                                 Experiment 2 
            An intention or goal can be defined in many different ways. Indeed, it is not 
clear how one can most accurately define a goal. In the Cole et al. (2012) experiments 
the goals were defined, and thus differed, in terms of end-point action; that is, the 
action participants performed once they had reached the target location (e.g., write or 
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erase a digit). However, the basis on which they selected a response location was 
always the same (localize a target stimulus). By contrast, in Ondobaka et al. (2012; 
2013), the end-point action was always the same (touch the screen) but participants 
selected their response location according to the selection rule of their co-actor 
(choose a high/low value card). Selection and action are semi-independent processes 
subserved by different brain mechanisms. For instance, neurological patients can 
often select an item from distractors but are unable to appropriately act upon them 
(e.g., Sirigu, Cohen, Duhamel, Pillon, Dubois, & Agid, 1995). Similarly, some 
patients are able to effectively act upon a stimulus but are not able to make an 
appropriate discrimination of the stimulus responded to (e.g., Milner & Goodale, 
1995). This difference in the results of Cole et al. and Ondobaka et al. could be due to 
their operational definitions of goals as respectively end-point and start point. The 
principal aim of the current experiment was to assess this distinction. 
        Following Ondobaka et al.’s operational definition of a goal, participants 
undertook the basic arm reaching task in which goals were defined by selection. Co-
actors were required to reach out and touch one of two letters forming a pair on the 
left or right side of the display. The participants’ goal was to either reach to the same 
letter as their co-actor or the different letter. As the goal was defined at the point of 
selection, the location of the response – and the response itself – remained the same. 
                                                     Method 
Stimuli and apparatus. All aspects of the experimental set-up were as described in 
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. Targets were either the letter S or H 
(measuring 20 mm in height and 14 mm in width) and were presented immediately 
adjacent to each other (see Figure 3).  
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Design and procedure. We employed a within-participants 2 x 2 design. As with 
Experiment 1, the first factor manipulated target location (repeated or opposite), 
whilst the second factor manipulated the goal congruency of the two participants 
(same or different). Participants undertook two blocks of trials in which they were 
instructed to reach out and touch the letter ‘S’ on every trial (thus, their co-actor’s 
response was always task irrelevant). In one of these blocks, the confederate co-actor 
would also reach to the letter S (i.e., same goal) whilst in another block he reached to 
the letter H (i.e., different goal). 
                                            Results and discussion 
         Outliers were defined as in Experiment 1 and accounted for 3.9% of responses 
which were omitted from further analysis. Figure 4 shows mean RTs. An ANOVA 
with target location (repeated or opposite) and goal (same or different) as within-
participants factors revealed a significant main effect of target location, F(1, 15) = 
36.6, p < .001, 2
pη = .71, BF10 = 43.59, with RTs on repeated target trials being 
longer than those on opposite trials. Importantly, there was no main effect of goal, 
F(1, 15) =.49, p =.61, 2
pη = .02, BF10 = 0.32, and the interaction between goal and 
location was not significant, F(1, 15) = 3.0, p = .11, 2
pη = .17, BF10 = 5.86. Bayesian 
analysis compared the interaction model between target location and goal with a 
model specifying a main effect of goal only. This revealed a preference for the main 
effect model, BF10 = 2.47, representing weak evidence in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis of a main effect of target location only over an interaction with goal. 
Overall, these data once again reveal the basic same-location slowing effect. 
However, even though goals were defined on the basis of a selection rule rather than 
as end-point actions, RTs were independent of the goal states of others.                                                                    
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                                             Experiment 3 
           One of the most fundamental properties of attentional selection is the 
distinction between selection based on spatial location and selection based on object 
representations. Duncan (1984) originally showed that when participants are asked to 
make simple perceptual judgments, performance is better if the decisions concern a 
single object compared to different objects, even when the latter all occur within the 
perimeter of the single object and thus occupy the same amount of space. Similarly, 
attention is known to move more rapidly between two locations if they are grouped to 
form a single object (Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994) and the inhibition accrued during 
IOR can travel with an object as it moves from one location to another (Jordan & 
Tipper, 1998; Tipper, Jordan & Weaver, 1999). Furthermore, the present action 
observation effect is also known to be sensitive to locations and objects. For instance, 
Atkinson et al. (2014) demonstrated that perceptually grouping a non-responded-to 
location with a location that a co-actor just reached to induces the same-location 
slowing effect. 
             In the experiments of Cole et al. (2012), objects (and locations) were shared 
between the co-actors: when a participant reached to the same side of the display as a 
co-actor’s previous response, it was always to the same object (e.g., Figure 1). By 
contrast, in Ondobaka et al.’s (2012; 2013) studies, the stimuli to which participants 
reached were located in the four corner segments of the array; thus, different objects 
and different locations. This methodological difference raises the possibility that 
actions may represent goals only when co-actors act on different but adjacent objects 
and not when actors reach to the same object/location. In the present experiment 
therefore, we closely replicated the procedure of Cole et al. (2012; Experiment 1) 
with the exception that co-actors responded to a different object when reaching to the 
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same side as the previous response (see Figure 5). This change alone, however, would 
not enable us to differentiate between any goal-based action effect based on an object 
representation and one based on a spatial representation; responding to two separated 
objects invariably means that co-actors respond to two different locations. We 
therefore designed the experiment such that on half the trials co-actors reached to 
different locations contained within the same object. This was achieved through 
grouping the two locations in a manner commonly employed in many object-based 
attention experiments (e.g., Crundall, Cole, & Galpin, 2007; Egly et al. 1994; see the 
present Figure 5).  
                                                    Method 
Stimuli and apparatus. All aspects of the experimental set-up were as described 
previously with the following exceptions. Participants were presented with two black 
diamonds (0.4 cd/m2, 27 mm along each side), both located on one side of the display. 
These locations would occur 92 mm from each other and 182 mm from the fixation 
cross, as measured from their middle. In the grouped conditions, they were placed 
within a grey rectangle measuring 155 mm by 47 mm. 
Design and procedure. We employed a within-participants 2 x 2 x 2 design. The first 
factor manipulated target location (repeated or opposite), the second goal (same or 
different), and the third grouping (grouped or separate). Participants undertook four 
blocks of trials: 1) objects grouped, same goal, 2) objects grouped, different goal, 3) 
objects separate, same goal, 4) objects separate, different goal. Whilst participants 
always performed the same goal in all four blocks, being instructed to “touch the 
point of the diamond nearest to you”, their confederate co-actor performed either this 
touching task or pantomimed the gripping task of Experiment 1. The co-actor’s 
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response was always incidental to the participant’s task. All other aspects of the 
design and procedure were as described previously. 
                                         Results and discussion 
           Outliers, defined as above, accounted for 3.8% of responses and were omitted 
from further analysis. Figure 6 shows mean RTs. A within-participants factorial 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of target location, F(1, 15) = 28.8, p < 
.001, 2
pη = .66, BF10 = 439.85, but no significant effect of grouping, F(1, 15) = .1, p 
> .74, 2
pη  .001, BF10 = 0.21, or goal, F(1, 15) = .66, p > .42, 
2
pη = .043, BF10 = .29. 
The interactions between goal and grouping, F(1, 15) = 1.20, p = .18 2
pη = .12, BF10 
= 0.04, location and grouping, F(1, 15) = .17, p = .21 2
pη = .10, BF10 = 19.49 and 
location and goal F(1, 15) = .44, p = .52 2
pη = 1.03, BF10 = 37.61 were not 
significant. There was also no significant location x goal x grouping  interaction F(1, 
15) = 1.49, p = .24 2
pη = 0.09, BF10 = 0.66. Bayesian analysis compared the 
interaction model between goal and target location, with the model for a main effect 
of target location only. This analysis revealed a preference for the main effect model, 
BF10 = 663.42, corresponding to decisive evidence in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis of a main effect of target location against an interaction between target 
location and goal. Overall, these results show that, although an action observation 
effect was present, it was not influenced by the goals of the co-actors. This absence of 
a goal-based effect occurred irrespective of whether co-actors reached to the same 
location or different location, or if the targets were part of the same object or not. This 
finding therefore supports the emerging conclusion that the kinematics of the action 
have the primary influence, whereas the coding of the goals of the action have a 
minimal, if any, influence. 
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                                             Experiment 4 
          In the experiments of Cole et al. (2012), and the present Experiments 1-3, 
participants directed their actions to a single left or right location by a peripheral 
target. The response location was therefore determined in a ‘bottom-up’ manner by an 
attention-capturing target event. By contrast, in the experiments of Ondobaka et al. 
(2012; 2013), the response location was determined by a ‘top-down’ process in which 
participants selected the location based on some feature of two stimuli (e.g., which 
card has the higher value?). The discrepant results by Cole et al. and Ondobaka et al. 
may therefore reflect the fundamental difference between exogenous and endogenous 
processes (see for instance, Itti & Koch, 2000). The implication is that actions may be 
sensitive to goals when a movement is made towards a location based on endogenous 
attention but not when the location is determined by an exogenous cue. Indeed, one 
might argue that goals are primarily a top-down entity as, by their very definition, 
they represent prospective intentionality – that is, an individual’s immediate or future 
plans. A further and related issue concerning the top-down/bottom-up distinction 
made between the experiments of Cole et al. and Ondobaka et al. was the requirement 
for participants to attend respectively to one or both sides of the display. The 
imperative in Cole et al. was for participants to react to the onset of a single target on 
any given trial, while those in Ondobaka et al. were asked to make a judgement 
between two stimuli. Indeed, previous evidence has shown that the arm movement 
phenomenon is reduced in tasks where participants must discriminate between two 
objects on different sides of the display (Atkinson et al., 2014). In the present 
experiment therefore, participants were required to monitor the stimuli presented on 
both sides and respond to one, as in Ondobaka et al. (2012; 2013). Specifically, two 
objects were presented, one on either side, and participants reached to one of them.  
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                                                    Method 
Stimuli and apparatus. All aspects of these were as described previously with the 
following exceptions. Participants were presented with two objects, one located on 
either side of the display. These differed either in colour or in form. In the colour 
discrimination blocks, the two objects were two squares (14 mm along each side) each 
positioned 175 mm from the fixation cross, as measured from their middle (see Figure 
1). One square was red (10.6 cd/m2), the other was green (50.6 cd/m2). In the form 
discrimination blocks, one object was a solid black square whilst the other was a solid 
black circle (both 0 cd/m2). The size of the squares was as reported above. The circle 
was 8 mm in diameter. Unlike all other experiments reported here, the two co-actors 
were experimental participants, rather than one participant and one confederate co-
actor as in Experiments 1-3. 
Design and procedure. We employed a within-participants 2 x 2 x 2 design with 
target location (repeated or opposite), goal (same or different), and task (colour or 
form) as factors. With respect to the last factor, participants were required to make 
discrimination responses, either responding to one of the two coloured squares, or to 
one of the two shapes. This instruction necessitated participants to attend to both sides 
of the array before selecting the correct one. All participants took part in eight blocks 
of trials with each block requiring a different or same task with respect to their 
partner. Specifically, participant pairs undertook eight variations of the task 
conditions. For the colour discrimination blocks:  1) both reached to the red target, 2) 
both reached to the green target, 3) Participant A reached to the red target, Participant 
B to the green target, 4) Participant A reached to the green target, Participant B to the 
red target. For the form discrimination blocks: 5) both reached to the circle, 6) both 
reached to the square, 7) Participant A reached to the circle, Participant B to the 
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square, 8) Participant A reached to the square, Participant B to the circle. Each co-
actors’ task was always irrelevant to that of their partners’, although each person was 
always made aware of their partner’s response goal. The presentation order of the 
colour and form discrimination blocks was counterbalanced and the goal blocks were 
presented in a random order. 
                                           Results and discussion 
            There were 3.2% of responses identified as outliers and omitted from further 
analysis. Figure 7 shows mean RTs for each of the eight conditions. An ANOVA with 
target location, task, and goal as within-participants factors revealed a significant 
main effect of target location, F(1, 17) = 8.20, p < 0.02, 2
pη = .33, BF10 = 0.39, but 
neither the main effects of task, F(1, 17) = .63, p =.44, 2
pη = .04, BF10 = .58,  nor 
goal, F(1, 17) = 1.67, p =.21, 2
pη = .036, BF10 = 0.70, were significant. There was no 
interaction between task and goal, F(1, 17) = 1.62, p =.44, 2
pη = .04, BF10 = .11, task 
and location, F(1, 17) = .01, p =.93, 2
pη <.001, BF10 = 0.05, nor goal and location, 
F(1, 17) = .26, p =.619, 2
pη =.02, BF10 = 0.07. Finally there was no significant three-
way interaction, F(1, 17) = .034, p =.86, 2
pη =.002, BF10 = 9.04e -4. Bayesian 
analysis compared a model for the interaction between goal and target location, with 
the model for a main effect of target location only. This revealed a preference for the 
main effect model, BF10 = 8.84, corresponding to moderate evidence in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis of an effect of target location only over an interaction. 
Comparison of the three-way interaction model with the main effect of target location 
only, demonstrated preference for the main effect model, BF10 = 491.78, 
corresponding to very strong evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis that 
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there was a main effect of target location over a three-way interaction. Overall, these 
data reveal that the action observation effect occurs irrespective of whether co-actors 
respond to a peripheral exogenous stimulus or discriminate between two stimuli. This 
finding in turn does not support the notion that the goal of the observed action 
influences the movement planning of the observer.  
                                               Experiment 5 
         As already suggested, one of the challenges in examining (and therefore 
manipulating) goal states in the laboratory is that goals can be represented 
hierarchically across any number of levels, ranging from specific to the general, from 
proximal to distal. For instance, whereas experimenters might define a goal as 
reaching to a red or a green square, the participants’ goal might simply be to 
participate in a laboratory experiment in exchange for payment or course credit. 
Furthermore, as Paternotte (2014) has pointed out, “There exist many competing 
philosophical definitions of joint action and no clear criteria to decide between them; 
so far the search for definitions has by and large been a semantical enterprise rather 
than an empirical one” (p. 103). Paternotte goes on to suggest that most definitions of 
joint action imply the collective adoption of common goals. In its broadest sense, all 
participants in joint action experiments adopt the common goal of participating in a 
joint action task. In Experiment 5, then, we sought to define and manipulate a goal in 
the most consensual and unequivocal way achievable in a laboratory setting.  To that 
end, co-actors again undertook the reaching paradigm but were required to actively 
collaborate (or not) on a shared task across an entire block of trials, with successful 
completion dependent on cooperation. Specifically, participants were required to 
reach out, pick up a pen, and either jointly complete a dot-to-dot drawing with their 
co-actor or perform this task without the assistance of their partner. Thus, in the 
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former condition cooperation was required in order to complete the shared goal whilst 
in the latter there was no cooperation and the goal could not be completed. The design 
was therefore based on a common purpose or intention (i.e., goal) that could be 
accomplished only through explicit cooperation. 
                                                 Method 
          All aspects of these methods were as described previously with the following 
exceptions. As with our other experiments, participants were asked to reach to a left 
or right location depending on the position of a target. Once they had done so, they 
were then required to pick up a pen resting on a pad of paper, and draw one small 
section of a house as one does in a child’s dot-to-dot drawing book (see Figure 8). 
They were informed that they could choose any section to draw on each trial. This 
differed from the common dot-to-dot drawings in which numbers are placed adjacent 
to the dots suggesting a particular drawing sequence. There were 103 dots on each 
drawing. This meant that both houses (i.e., left and right) would be completed when 
both co-actors (i.e., participant and confederate) performed the drawing task but not 
when only the participant did this task. The special cues were solid black circles (0 
cd/m2, diameter 8 mm) appearing for 100 ms and positioned 175mm to the left or 
right of a centrally located fixation point. The pens were located on the two pads 
measuring 24 cm long, 15 cm wide and 4 cm high. Their height meant that both were 
level with the touchscreen.  
Design and procedure. We again employed a 2 x 2 design with the first factor 
manipulating target location and the second factor manipulating goal. All aspects of 
the procedure were as described previously with the exception that participants were 
asked to reach out to the target location and attempt to complete the dot-to-dot 
drawing. On one block of trials they were told that they would need to cooperate with 
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the co-actor to achieve this goal whilst on another block they were told that the co-
actor would not be cooperating; instead they would be drawing a number 7 on the pad 
on each trial. The presentation order of the two blocks was counterbalanced. 
                                            Results and discussion   
         Outliers accounted for 3.6% of all responses and were omitted from further 
analysis. Figure 9 shows mean RTs. An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
target location, F(1, 15) = 8.3, p < .05, 
2
pη = .36, BF10 = 0.42, and a significant main 
effect of goal, F(1, 15) = 19.0, p < .001, 
2
pη = .56, BF10 = 2238066.36. The 
interaction, however, was not significant, F(1, 15) = 2.4, p = .14, 
2
pη = .14, BF10 = 
111926.80. The Bayesian analysis compared an interaction model between target 
location and goal, against the alternative hypothesis of an additive main effects model 
containing these factors. This revealed preference for the additive main effects model, 
BF10 = 1.46, corresponding to weak evidence in favour the alternative hypothesis of 
an additive effect of goal and target location over an interaction. Thus, despite the fact 
that co-actors were required to explicitly cooperate, these data therefore once again 




                                                Experiment 6 
         Experiments 1-5 teased apart the differences in the methods of previous 
experiments in order to examine when goals influence kinematics and when they do 
not. We have found however that imitative movements are not influenced by goal 
states. Experiments 6 and 7 therefore represented a slight shift in focus by performing 
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direct replications of Ondobaka et al. (2012; 2013). Experiment 7 will also examine 
an alternative account to the imitation explanation of the basic same-location slowing 
effect. 
              In Experiment 6, we replicated2 the procedure of Ondobaka et al. (2013) in 
which the authors argued for ‘spontaneous goal recognition’ (cf. Ondobaka et al., 
2012, in which goal recognition was an explicit component of the task). In their 2013 
experiment, four blocks of trials were presented in which ‘movement-control’ and 
‘action-control’ was manipulated. In the former, participants were instructed to reach 
out to the same location on every trial. Thus, on one block they were required to 
always reach to the left side whilst on another block they always reached to the right. 
In the latter (i.e., action-control), participants were instructed to reach to a particular 
relative value card on every trial. Thus, on one block they were required to always 
reach to the higher value card whilst on another block they reached to the lower value 
card. Their confederate co-actor, by contrast, reached to either high or low on every 
trial of each block (indicated by a cue). This meant that on half the trials within each 
block, participants happened to reach to the same relative value card as their co-actor 
(e.g., both reached ‘high’), whilst on the other half they happened to reach to a 
different relative value card (e.g., co-actor reached ‘low’, participant reached ‘high’). 
Ondobaka et al. found that the same-location slowing effect occurred only when the 
participant and co-actor happened to respond to the same relative value card, i.e., had 
the same goal, an effect which itself occurred only in the movement-control 
condition. That is, when participants guided their behaviour based on a physical 
movement. Ondobaka et al. argued that these findings demonstrate that participants 
spontaneously recognise a co-actor’s goal.  
                                                  Method 
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         All aspects of the Method were as described previously and closely followed 
Ondobaka et al. (2013). Thus, on each trial, four ‘spade’ cards (4.5 cm x 6.5 cm) were 
presented faced down. The confederate co-actor was presented with a visual cue 
(either the letter ‘H’ for ‘High’ or ‘L’ for ‘Low’) informing him of which card should 
be selected on that trial. The cue was presented in the middle of the display and was 
visible only to the co-actor. After a variable delay of between 0.5 and 2.5 s, the cards 
on the confederate’s side of the display were revealed and he reached to the higher or 
the lower value card as per his instruction. The execution of his response caused the 
cards on the participant's side of the display to be revealed and the participant then 
reached out and selected the appropriate card/location. Both actors returned their hand 
to the home button immediately after touching the screen and the next trial was 
initiated when the participant had completed this move. Four blocks of trials were 
presented in which the participant performed one of four goals: 1) reach to the left 
hand card, 2) reach to the right hand card, 3) reach to the high value card, and 4) reach 
to the low value card. The first two blocks were therefore the ‘movement-control’ 
conditions of Ondobaka et al. whilst the last two were the ‘action-control’ conditions. 
The participants were not informed as to whether their co-actor was instructed to 
select the high or low card. The additional aspects of the cards outlined by Ondobaka 
et al. were also employed here. Thus, the four cards were always different; the 
higher/lower card appeared on the left and right with equal probability; the numerical 
value of the two cards always differed by one; the card selected by the participant was 
independent of the one selected by the co-actor; and ‘catch’ trials were included in 
which participants were instructed not to respond, but which required them to scan all 
the cards. Catch trials occurred on 23% of trials and were denoted by the presence of 
a card with a value of ‘2’ appearing on the participant’s or the co-actor’s side with 
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equal probability. Each block consisted of 104 trials and their presentation order 
counterbalanced. A 2 x 2 x 2 design was employed in which target location, goal, and 
task were manipulated. Note that in order to maintain consistency with all other 
experiments reported here, we refer to target location as being repeated or opposite. 
This contrasts with Ondobaka et al. who, in suggesting that same-location RT slowing 
is due to movement compatibility, refer to ‘movement-congruent’ and ‘movement-
incongruent’ as opposed to opposite and repeated, respectively.   
                                          Results and discussion 
         A total of 3.1% of responses were identified as outliers and were omitted from 
further analysis. Figure 10 shows mean RTs. An ANOVA with target location, goal, 
and task as within-participants factors revealed a significant main effect of task, F(1, 
15) = 60.9, p < .001, 
2
pη = .8, BF10 = 4.32+e31, though neither the main effects of 
location, F(1, 15) = .98, p =.34, 2
pη = .06, BF10 = .19,  nor goal, F(1, 15) = .03, p 
=.86, 2
pη = .002, BF10 = .16, were significant. The effect of task revealed that RTs 
were shorter in the movement-control than in the action-control conditions. Across 
goal x task, F(1, 15) = 1.59, p =.23, 2
pη = .10, BF10 = 2.33e+30, goal x location, F(1, 
15) = .08, p =.79, 2
pη , <.001, BF10 = .01 and location x task, F(1, 15) = .70, p =.42, 
2
pη < .05, BF10 = 2.45e+30, none of the interaction effects were significant. There 
was additionally no three-way interaction, F(1, 15) = 2.26, p =.02, 2
pη = .13, BF10 = 
1.42e+28. To further maintain consistency with Ondobaka et al. (2013), we also 
examined the two levels of task (movement control and action control) separately in 
two 2 x 2 ANOVAs. With respect to movement control, there was no effect of goal, 
F(1, 15) = .5, p > .4, 
2
pη = .03, BF10  = .29, nor target location, F(1, 15) = 1.0, p > .32, 
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2
pη < .06,  BF10  = 0.52. There was, however, a marginally significant goal x target 
location interaction, F(1, 15) = 4.5, p = .051, 
2
pη = .23, BF10  = .13, suggesting that 
the reaching effect is larger in the different goal conditions. With respect to action 
control, again neither the effect of goal, F(1, 15) = .55, p = .47, 
2
pη = .035, BF10  = 
0.33, nor target location, F(1, 15) = .04, p = .85, 
2
pη = .003, BF10  = .31 were 
significant and there was no interaction between these factors, F(1, 15) = 0.56, p = 
.47, 
2
pη = .04, BF10  = 0.39. As none of the Bayes factors favoured an individual 
effect, additive effects or an interaction model over the null hypothesis model, no 
further model comparison was undertaken for either the movement control or action 
control levels of task. Overall, the present results do not replicate those previously 
reported by Ondobaka et al. (2013). Recall that they observed the present action 
observation effect only when the confederate co-actor’s goal coincided with that of 
the participants. The authors suggested that these findings revealed spontaneous goal 
recognition. We, however, found no evidence for spontaneous recognition of goal 
congruency. Indeed, the reaching phenomenon was larger in the movement-control 
condition when the co-actor and participants performed different goals. Although an 
abundance of evidence does show that goal inference can occur spontaneously 
(Csibra, et al., 1999; Hassin et al., 2005; Van der Cruyssen, et al., 2009), our results 
suggest that such automatic inference does not occur at the level at which specific 
movements are represented. In sum, these results concur with Cole et al. (2012), and 
our current experiments: action observation does not appear to represent the goals of 
co-actors or at minimum, the coding of the kinematics of the action has the primary 
influence relative to goal coding. 
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                                                 Experiment 7 
             The aims of Experiment 7 were twofold. First, we sought to examine why the 
basic same-location slowing effect occurs, and second, to replicate the procedure of 
Ondobaka et al. (2012) in which the recognition of the partner’s goal was an explicit 
part of the task (cf. Ondobaka et al., 2013). This protocol can be viewed as the more 
liberal of the two experiments reported by Ondobaka and colleagues (i.e., Ondobaka 
et al., 2012; 2013) because the goals effect occurred when participants were required 
to perform the goal just seen rather than the goal being computed spontaneously. 
Recall from the Introduction that the confederate co-actor in Ondobaka et al. (2012) 
reached to the higher or lower of two cards and the participant was required to 
perform the same goal (in one block) and the different goal (in another block).  
           With respect to the primary aim of examining why the basic phenomenon 
occurs, the majority of authors have placed the effect within the context of inhibitory 
processes (e.g., Cole et al, 2012; Skarratt et al, 2010; Welsh et al, 2005). For instance, 
Welsh et al. (2005) showed that in the same way that participants are slower to aim 
two consecutive responses to the same spatial location, they are also slower when 
repeating the response of their co-actor. Welsh et al. argued that the same response 
codes are activated when performing or observing an action, thus giving rise to the 
same inhibitory aftereffect. Whilst Welsh et al. argue that the effect is due to action 
co-representation mechanisms they do not place it within the context of direct 
matching. They do however additionally suggest that the effect is mediated by the 
mirror neuron system (di Pellegrino, et al. 1992). This network is thought to become 
active both during action execution and when the same action is observed. As Welsh 
et al. (2007) stated, “We hypothesize that the activation of the mirror neuron system 
during the observation of the response mimicked the activity associated with the 
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actual response” (p. 955). It is this mimicking that was said to induce IOR in the 
observer. Ondobaka, et al. (2012) however, placed the phenomenon within the 
context of movement compatibility. Thus, the authors suggested that a reach to the 
right hand target by co-actor A will facilitate a reach by co-actor B to their own right 
hand side. This facilitation results in reduced RTs to targets appearing at the opposite 
location to the previous trial – the same pattern of data that the inhibition account 
predicts (and shows). In contrast to the action co-representation accounts of 
Ondobaka et al.  (2012) and Welsh et al. (2005), Cole et al. (2012) suggested that 
action representation mechanisms are not necessary for the effect to occur. These 
authors argued that a body movement, as with any visual ‘transient’, acts as a cue that 
shifts an observer’s attention to the reached-to location. This shift in attention then 
induces IOR in the observer at the location of the cue.  
              In the present experiment, we assessed the action representation and 
attentional accounts by introducing an additional factor in which lone participants 
(i.e., with no partner present) were presented with a transient cue that flashed on one 
side of the display at the location of one of the cards. This cue effectively replaced the 
arm movement transient that occurs when a co-actor responds in the standard 
paradigm. In this transient cue condition, participants were asked to perform a 
reaching response to the location of the cued card. A necessary condition of 
supporting the attention shift account is that the same pattern of data should be 
observed when a co-actor’s response is replaced by an attention capturing transient – 
i.e., an increase in RT on same target trials relative to different target trials in the 
absence of a goal-directed movement.  
                                                Method 
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Stimuli and Apparatus. Stimuli presentation and response recording was programmed 
using PsychoPy libraries for psychophysics in Python (Peirce, 2007). This experiment 
was executed from a MacBook Pro computer. All stimuli were presented on a 1920 x 
1080 resolution 23” touchscreen that was placed on a table. A pair of Sennheiser 
headphones delivered response instructions to the co-actor throughout the procedure. 
The cue was a brief (150 ms) luminance change in which the card was replaced by a 
uniformly white rectangle (65.0 cd/m2). 
Design and procedure. A 2 x 2 x 2 within-participants design was employed in which 
location (repeated or opposite), goal (same or different), and cue type (action or 
luminance) were manipulated. The cue type factor varied whether the confederate co-
actor responded prior to the participant’s response or this was replaced by one of the 
two cards briefly changing luminance. Thus on action trials, the co-actor made a 
response to either the higher or lower card on the trial prior to that of the participant. 
On luminance trials by contrast, a luminance change occurred at the location of either 
the higher or lower value card. The levels of the cue type and goal factors were 
blocked in four experimental conditions: 1) action cue, same goal, 2) action cue, 
different goal, 3) luminance cue, same goal, and 4) luminance cue, different goal.  
The procedure for the action cue blocks directly replicated that of Ondobaka et al. 
(2012).  In each block, participants completed 168 trials, consisting of 84 same 
location trials and 84 different location trials. At the beginning of the co-actor cue 
blocks, participants were told to observe the location of the co-actor’s response and to 
adopt the same card goal during their own response. Each trial of these two blocks 
began with the display of the fixation screen for 1000ms. The audio response 
instruction was delivered to the co-actor and consisted of a wave sound lasting 500 ms 
with either the words “higher” or “lower”. Following the instruction, the co-actor 
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cards would be revealed and he then reached to either the higher or lower card. As 
soon as contact was made with the touchscreen, the card stimuli would disappear and 
the co-actor returned their hand to the start button. After a duration of 500ms, the 
participant’s card appeared and remained visible until their subsequent response made 
contact with the touchscreen. Trials terminated when the participant returned his or 
her index finger to the start button. For luminance blocks, participants were asked to 
observe the location of the cue presentation and adopt the same card goal during their 
own response. These trials began with fixation for 1500 ms, which equated to the time 
in co-actor trials for the presentation and audio instruction cue. Following fixation, the 
cards were presented for 1500 ms, which approximated the typical movement times of 
co-actors. After card stimuli fixation, one of the cards illuminated using a white 
transient presented for 150 ms. Following the presentation of the cue, the card stimuli 
disappeared and the participant’s trial was initiated as in co-actor trials. Unlike all 
other experiments reported here, the interval between target presentation and touching 
of the screen was used as RT.  
                                           Results and discussion 
          There were 2.9% of responses defined as outliers and omitted from further 
analysis. Figure 11 shows mean RTs. An ANOVA with target location, goal, and cue 
type as within-participants factors revealed significant effects of target location, F(1, 
15) = 12.3, p = .003, 
2
pη = .45, BF10 = .40, and cue type, F(1, 15) = 21.0, p < .001, 
2
pη = .58, BF10 = 29510.60, but no significant effect of goal, F(1, 15) = 1.8, p > .19, 
2
pη = .1, BF10 = .89. Analysis of the interactions between goal and cue type, F(1, 15) 
= .32, p =.58, 
2
pη = .02, BF10 = 13384.53, target location and cue type, F(1, 15) = 
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1.42, p = .25, 
2
pη = .086, BF10 = 3594.44, and goal and target location, F(1, 15) = 
1.64, p = .35, 
2
pη = .041, BF10 = .09, showed no significant effects. The three-way 
interaction was also not significant, F(1, 15) = .06, p = .77, 
2
pη = .01 BF10 = 160.42. 
Bayesian analysis compared the interaction model for goal and target location as well 
as that for cue type and location, to a model specifying a main effect of target location 
and cue type only. This revealed preference for the main effects model over the 
interaction model between goal and location, BF10 = 21651.61, and the interaction 
model between cue type and location, BF10 =29059.90. These results correspond to 
decisive evidence in favour the alternative hypothesis that there was a main effect of 
both cue type and target location over an interaction between location and goal. The 
Bayesian results also correspond to decisive evidence in favour of an alternative 
hypothesis of these main effects over an interaction between cue type and target 
location.  
        With respect to the aims of the present experiment, the most important findings 
concern evidence in favour of an effect of target location, which was independent of 
goal or cue type. Thus, we have found that the basic reaching phenomenon was not 
modulated according to the goals of co-actors and thus supports the findings of 
Experiments 2-6 and of Cole et al. (2012). That is, the effect does not appear to be 
goal-based. We have also found the target location effect to be the same irrespective 
of whether a co-actor made a reaching response or his action was replaced by a 
transient cue in his absence. Although this finding does not necessarily refute the 
action co-representation account, it does clearly show that IOR can be elicited by 
visual transients occurring at a given location – a conclusion consistent with an 
attention-based account of the basic effect.    
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                       Cross-experiment meta-analysis and replication 
Although none of the present seven experiments, nor the three reported by Cole et al. 
(2012), support the goals-based theory of movement, it is possible that such a 
phenomenon does exist but that the effect is small. We therefore performed a meta-
analysis combining the data from the seven present experiments and the three of Cole 
et al. (2012). For all 10 data sets, we analysed both levels of the target location factor 
(repeated, opposite), both levels of the goals factor (same, different), and all 10 levels 
of the experiment factor, in a 2 x 2 x 10 mixed ANOVA design. The target location 
and goals factors were repeated measures whilst the experiment factor was 
independent. Other factors specific to individual experiments (e.g., task relevancy, 
present Experiment 1) were collapsed within the factors stated above. Furthermore, 
we did not include the transient conditions of the present Experiment 7 in which no 
partner was present. Analysis of this much larger data set (N=162) revealed main 
effects of target location, F(1, 152) = 64.5, p < .0001, 
2
pη = .3, BF10 = 5.81, and 
experiment, F(9, 152) = 92.1, p < .0001,
2
pη = .85, BF10 = 3.00+e53,  yet no effect of 
goals, F(1, 152) = .04, p > .85, 
2
pη < .001, BF10 = .09. There was no significant target 
location x goals interaction, F(1, 152) = .77, p > .39, 
2
pη < .005, BF10 = .07. The 
target location x experiment, F(9, 152) = 1.66, p = .10, 
2
pη =  .090, BF10 = 4.03e+51, 
goals x experiment, F(9, 152) = .62, p = .78, 
2
pη =  .035, BF10 = 4.47e+51, and three-
way interactions were all non-significant F(9, 152) = .60, p = .79, 
2
pη =  .03, BF10 = 
6.97e+46. Bayesian analysis compared the model for an interaction between goal and 
target location to the additive model for target location and experiment only. This 
revealed preference for the additive model, BF10 =  9.94, corresponding to positive 
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evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis that there was an additive effect of 
experiment and target location over an interaction between goal and target location.  
          In addition to the meta-analysis and Bayesian analyses described above, we 
also replicated one of our experiments using N=46. This sample size was shown in an 
a priori power analysis to be able to detect a medium-to-large effect size (Cohen’s d ≥ 
0.5) with an 80% probability. Experiment 5 was chosen for replication because of its 
clearest operational definition of a task goal, i.e., cooperate (or not) with a co-actor in 
completing a line drawing. The results can be seen in Table 1. The ANOVA3 revealed 
a significant main effect of target location, F(1, 44) = 21.5, p < .001, 
2
pη = .33, BF10 
= 7.59, but no significant main effect of goal, F(1, 44) = 3.40, p > .07, 
2
pη = .07, BF10 
= 4.93. Importantly, the interaction was not significant, F(1, 44) = .48, p = .49, 
2
pη = 
.01  BF10 = 11.03 and Bayes factors revealed moderate evidence in favour of an 
additive main effects model compared to an interaction model, BF10 = 4.26,  
corroborating with a large sample size our earlier results. The coding of goals, if it 
occurs, does not influence the planning of a repeated action.  
                                           General Discussion 
        An abundance of work has shown that the observation of goal-directed 
behaviour can influence the actions performed by an observer. This is most clearly 
evident when two people cooperate on a joint action task such as moving a piece of 
furniture. Furthermore, evidence from a number of studies shows that observers are 
more likely to copy an action outcome than copy the means by which the outcome is 
achieved (e.g., Bekkering, et al. 2000). Moreover, many influential theories of social 
facilitation emphasize the primacy of goals over action kinematics (e.g., Carpenter, 
Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Gattis, Bekkering, & Wohlschläger, 2002) and one of the 
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mechanisms said to subserve action understanding, i.e., the mirror neuron system (di 
Pellegrino, Fadiga, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992), is thought to represent common 
goals rather than common body movement (e.g., Rizzolatti, Fabbri-Destro & 
Cattaneo, 2008).  
        However, one question of interest is whether the underlying goals are encoded 
when an observed action elicits an equivalent internal representation in the observer; 
that is, during direct matching of a specific movement. Although Wohlschläger and 
Bekkering (2002) did find an influence of goals on movements, whilst Chiavarino et 
al.’s (2013) found a counterintuitive effect of goal compatibility; i.e., a larger 
behavioural effect when participants’ goals differed from those of a model. 
Furthermore, employing the Welsh et al. (2005) arm reaching paradigm, Ondobaka et 
al. (2012; 2013) and Cole et al. (2012) reported contrasting results: whilst Ondobaka 
found a goals-based effect of action Cole et al. did not. The current study therefore set 
out to examine the conditions under which specific movements (e.g., reaching to a 
location) are influenced by goals and the conditions under which they are not. To that 
end, we examined goals and movements in the context of task relevancy, end-point 
action versus selection, objects and locations, and top-down versus bottom-up 
determination of response position. Thus, by isolating the main differences between 
the experiments of Cole et al. and Ondobaka et al., we assessed an action observation 
phenomenon with reference to a number of theoretical processes. However, in seven 
experiments, including two direct replications of Ondobaka et al. (2012; 2013), a 
meta-analysis and a separate large-sample replication of one of our own experiments, 
we have found no evidence that movements are influenced by the goals of co-actors. 
Neither the most conservative form of the goal-based theory, that is, spontaneous 
recognition of goals, nor the most liberal were supported. Although Experiment 1 did 
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show that the reaching phenomenon was influenced by goals, this was in the opposite 
direction to what might be expected, and indeed the direction reported by Ondobaka 
et al. (2012); the effect was smaller when participants adopted the same goal. 
Furthermore, although no effect of goals on the present action observation effect was 
observed in Experiment 2, the critical (target location by goals) interaction did reveal 
a small but non-significant effect, p = .11, 2
pη = .17, BF10 = 5.86. This experiment 
therefore, for whatever reason, may be the most sensitive to any goals-based effect, if 
it does occur. Any future work examining goals and action using the present 
paradigm may want to develop this particular experiment. 
 
At which level of representation do goals influence actions? 
       This question relates to one of the main issues facing any research aimed at 
assessing goals, and one highlighted by Cole et al. (2012) and Ondobaka et al. (2012); 
namely how should a particular goal be specified. Since the early ideas of James 
(1890) and McDougall (1908), goals have meant different things to different 
researchers. A fundamental distinction however relates to the difference between 
proximal and distal goals (e.g., Bandura, 1989), notions commonly used in the 
philosophy of action and the social psychology of goals. In keeping with Bekkering et 
al. (2000), Ondobaka et al. referred to the fact that intentions can be specified at 
multiple levels (see also Uithol, Burnston, & Haselager, 2014; Pacherie, 2008) and in 
particular made the distinction between movement intention (e.g., picking up a 
sponge with the aim of rotating it) and action intention (e.g., cleaning dirty dishes 
with the sponge). Similarly, Cole et al., made reference to the fact that a movement 
goal can be separated into subcomponents such as directed reach, object grasp, and 
return movement, a notion that is supported by patient work in which one or more 
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components can be separately affected (e.g., Sirigu et al., 1995). Thus, even the 
proximal intention of a simple action has a number of subgoals associated with it. 
Furthermore, as much as these components are subserved by distinct anatomical 
areas, goals, as noted, differ according to how experimenters conceive them. This 
point was made by the behaviourists who were concerned with goals in the context of 
motivational need theories (Atkinson, 1964; Lewin, 1926; McClelland, 1951; Murray, 
1938). As Gollwitzer and Moskowitz (1996) pointed out in an extensive review of 
how goals affect cognition and action, the behaviourists did not examine “how a self-
set goal affects behavior. For the behaviorist, a goal is just an incentive that is chosen 
by the investigator as a reference point for describing observed behavior”. Thus, 
Skinner (1953) described goals as simply an ‘abbreviation’ for describing (operant) 
behaviour. One does not however have to reject the cognitive revolution in order to 
accept that the conception of goal in the context of joint action is experimenter-
dependent. For instance, in Ondobaka et al. (2013) participants were required to 
respond as rapidly as possible whilst withholding a response on ‘catch’ trials. By 
contrast, their confederate co-actor was not presented with these no-go trials and did 
not therefore have to be concerned with inhibiting a response. The goals of each were 
thus always different. At the same time, co-actors were always required to attend to 
the numbers on the cards. Thus, their goals were also always the same. Despite the 
different ways in which goals can be conceived, we contend that in terms of goals and 
actions it is most useful to distinguish between movement intention and action 
intention, as Ondobaka et al. (2012) did. The evidence from previous work appears to 
show that goals are represented in the general sense in which action can be conceived 
(e.g., cleaning dirty dishes with a sponge). The present work however suggests that 
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goals are not predominantly represented with respect to specific movements (e.g., 
picking up a sponge and rotating it). 
              The issue of goal definition may also help explain the contrasting results 
found by the present experiments and those of past studies showing that goals can 
modulate specific movements (e.g., Bouquet, et al. 2010; Liepelt et al., 2008; 
Wohlschläger & Bekkering, 2002). Previous studies have tended to manipulate 
inferred goals based on some manipulation of the stimuli. For instance, Bouquet et al. 
(2010) presented participants with a video showing an actor perform arm reaching 
movements. In the ‘non-goal-directed’ conditions the actor simply reached out into 
empty space. To generate the ‘goal-directed’ conditions, the same video sequence was 
shown with the exception that a large circular red dot was superimposed onto the film 
at the location of the actor’s end-point reach. Because participants were not explicitly 
told that the actor’s goal was to reach to a red dot, the experimental set-up required 
participants to infer that the dots were part of the actor’s goal. Of course, this does not 
negate the fact that Bouquet et al. did observe a difference in participant reaching 
behaviour when the dots were present or not. However, the fact that the dots were 
clearly not present or visible to the actor means that it is difficult to interpret the result 
in terms of goal state attribution. By contrast, in the present experiments goals did not 
need to be implicitly inferred; participants were always told “your goal is the same” or 
“your goal will be different on this block”.  
What causes the  same-location slowing effect? 
         Although the primary aim of the present work was to examine the issue of goals 
in movement planning, Experiment 7 has provided evidence pertaining to the possible 
cause of the basic effect reported by Welsh et al. (2005). As described in the 
Introduction, Welsh and colleagues placed the effect within the context of the mirror 
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neuron system and perceptual-motor models (e.g., Hommel, 2009) that suggest 
observed actions are incorporated within one’s own action planning. Similarly, 
Ondobaka et al. (2012) also argued that the effect is due to the representation of 
actions. Specifically, the initiation of a movement that is congruent (i.e., imitates) 
with one just observed was said to be facilitated. In contrast to these action 
representation theories,  Cole et al. suggested that there is nothing particularly special 
about action per se because any motion transient can induce IOR (see Abrams & 
Christ, 2003). Furthermore, this explanation is not refuted by experiments showing 
that the reaching effect still occurs when peripheral motion transients are obscured 
either by opaque goggles (Welsh et al., 2007) or physical barriers (Skarratt et al., 
2010). Here, the cue becomes the initial portion of the movement; what is commonly 
referred to as a ‘central’ cue in the attentional cueing literature (e.g., Cole, Smith, & 
Atkinson, 2015). Additionally, the phenomenon may be part of a range of effects 
collectively referred to as social attention. Common to all of these behaviours is the 
disposition to direct attention to locations of interest in the environment as a result of 
social cues. These cues can include gaze, gesture and goal-directed action and can 
induce shifts of attention, as well as IOR (Birmingham & Kingstone, 2009; Gervais, 
Reed, Beall, & Roberts, 2010). Indeed, there is some evidence that such social cues 
operate via channels that are relatively independent from motion cues, at least with 
respect to gaze cues and head motion (Böckler, van der Wel, & Welsh, 2014).    
Although Welsh and colleagues include attentional orienting as part of their account 
(i.e., IOR), action representation is still central to their explanation. By contrast, the 
Cole et al. account predicts that any luminance cue, including a brief luminance 
change at the location of a card, should induce the effect. This is precisely what was 
found in Experiment 7: Irrespective of whether a co-actor responded, or this action 
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was replaced by a luminance cue, a same/different target RT effect occurred. The 
hypothesis that the effect is due to the capture of attention by motion cues (e.g., a 
moving arm), and the subsequent IOR, supports recent work arguing that the 
phenomenon is primarily attentional in origin (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2014; Doneva & 
Cole, 2014). However, as we noted in Experiment 7, observing ‘social IOR’-like data 
when a co-actor’s response is replaced by a luminance cue does not on its own refute 
the action representation account. This finding does, however, suggest that the shift of 
attention is likely a necessary condition for the effect to emerge. 
Attention in joint action 
        The results from Experiment 7 also concern a more general issue regarding 
attentional cueing in joint action. The vast majority of action observation work, 
including review articles (e.g., Galantucci & Sebanz, 2009), make no reference to 
attention (e.g., Braun, Ortega, & Wolpert, 2011; Paulus & Moore, 2007; Vesper, van 
der Wel, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2007; Atmaca, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2007). When 
attention is mentioned it is never acknowledged that attentional cueing may play a 
significant role in an effect. Indeed, the potential confound of action as an attentional 
cue has been shown in the most common joint action paradigm. As with the present 
paradigm, the ‘joint Simon effect’ shows that the presence of another acting partner 
modulates one’s own responses and has similarly been explained with reference to the 
representation of observed and executed action. However, similar to the present 
Experiment 7, Dolk, et al., (2013) showed that the effect can be induced by any 
sufficiently salient stimulus that attracts attention (and induces a ‘referential code’; 
Hommel, 1993) to where the co-actor would normally respond, for example, a clock 
that emits an audible clicking sound. Thus, a phenomenon that was believed to be 
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caused by the integration of another person’s action into one’s own action planning 
appears to be due to attentional orienting.  
         In sum, previous work has shown that the goals of other people’s actions can 
influence the general actions of an observer. In the present work, we have examined 
the circumstances under which specific actions, influenced by the observation of 
similar movements, are modulated by the goals of those observed actions. We found 
that although a reaching action is modulated by the observation of the same action, 
this was not influenced by the goals of the action. This set of findings indicates that 
the mechanisms that code for action kinematics can have a primary influence on 
action planning; a conclusion that stands in contrast to the primacy of goal coding.  
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                                                   Footnotes  
1) It is not yet known why the arm reaching phenomenon occurs. Welsh et al. (2005) 
and Ondobaka et al. (2012) both argued that action representation mechanisms play a 
role in the basic effect. However, much like Dolk, Hommel, Prinz and Liepelt, (2013) 
with respect to the ‘joint Simon effect’, Cole et al. (2012) have raised the possibility 
that the effect is associated with the attentional shifts generated by observing an 
action. It is also possible that both motor and attentional mechanisms contribute to the 
effect with different degrees of contribution of each being dependent on the 
conditions of the task. See the present Experiment 7 and General Discussion. 
2) As pointed out by a number of authors (e.g., Schmidt, 2009; Koole & Lakens, 
2012), a direct replication is a study in which ‘all the relevant aspects’ (Schmidt, 
2009) of the original study are repeated. This contrasts a conceptual replication in 
which a hypothesis is tested using a different design (Tsang & Kwan, 1999). Koole 
and Lakens, (2012) also noted that ‘a given researcher is inevitably prone to the 
idiosyncrasies in procedural details or how she or he treats participants (to name two 
examples)’. Furthermore, although over 50 years have passed since the seminal paper 
of Cohen (1962), experimental psychology has only recently become concerned with 
issues regarding effect sizes, p-values, replication, and their associates. Moreover, 
whilst asking ‘Why do psychology journals systematically refuse to publish 
replications?’, Schmidt (2009) notes that ‘replications are likely to become associated 
with controversy. This is unproductive and unjustified’. 
3) The analysis was conducted on N=45 due to the omission of one participant for 
making a large number (>20%) of anticipatory errors. 
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                                               Figure captions 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the standard action observation paradigm 
reported by Welsh et al. (2005) and Skarratt et al. (2010). Results typically show that 
co-actors are slower to initiate a reaching action to the location that their partner just 
reached to, or conversely, they are quicker to reach to the opposite location. 
Figure 2. Results from Experiment 1. 
Figure 3. The stimuli employed in Experiment 2. 
Figure 4. Results from Experiment 2. 
Figure 5. The stimuli employed in Experiment 3. The upper panel shows the 
‘separate’ condition, the lower panel shows the ‘grouped’ condition. 
Figure 6. Results from Experiment 3. 
Figure 7. Results from Experiment 4. 
Figure 8. The experimental set-up, including the dot-to-dot house and pencil, 
employed in Experiment 5. The figure also shows the cue. Note that the house 
comprised 103 dots rather than the 66 shown on the figure.  
Figure 9. Results from Experiment 5. 
Figure 10. Results from Experiment 6. 
Figure 11. Results from Experiment 7. 
 
Table caption 
Mean RTs (and standard deviations; both in ms) from the replication of Experiment 5, 
comparing actions as a function of response location and goal compatibility. The 
magnitude of same-location slowing is reported in the right column, and does not 

































































































































































                                                                                      
























































                                                       
 












Goal Compatibility Spatial Location  
Same Different Effect Size (ms) 
Same 538 (87) 517 (81) 21 





                                                             END 
